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THE PARTIAL VETO POWER:
LEGISLATION BY THE GOVERNOR
Timothy P. Burke*

The legislative process in Washington, as in almost all other states,
is not exclusively a function of the Legislature, but rather it is a function which the Legislature shares with the Governor who is vested
with the power to veto bills. Unlike the activity of the Legislature, the
role played by the Governor is not highly visible and is not often the
subject of attention. Yet, this relative obscurity is not indicative of the
influence that the Governor exercises in the legislative process.
Through his use of the partial veto power, authorized under Article
III, Section 12, of the Washington Constitution and liberally construed by the Washington court, the Governor has assumed a major
role in the legislative process. This brief article will describe the legal
basis and extent of this role and discuss the need for its clarification
and limitation;' a constitutional amendment will be proposed to satisfy this need.
I.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE VETO POWER
Washington Constitution Article III, Section 12, provides:
Every act which shall have passed the legislature shall be, before it
becomes a law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall sign

* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n, Research Director, Office of Program Research, Washington House of Representatives; B.A., Pennsylvania State University.
1964; LL.B., George Washington University, 1967.
1. As used in this article, partial veto means any veto of less than an entire bill.
Section veto usually means removing a subdivision as it is actually shown in a bill,
but in Washington it means removing a distinct subject matter. See text accompanying
notes 4-7 infra. The word "items" usually refers to items in an appropriation bill, i.e.,
"appropriation items." See Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31
TEMP. L.Q. 27 (1957). The power to veto "items" is possessed by the governors of 40
states, in addition to Washington. The states which do not grant their governors
power to veto "items" are Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Vermont. With few exceptions, all of the, Washington Governors have viewed the word "items" as being limited to "appropriation
items." Notwithstanding this history, there are many knowledgeable persons, including
the present Governor and his legal staff, who construe the word "items" to mean
any word, phrase, punctuation or other matter in a bill.
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he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in
have originated, which house shall enter the objections
the journal and proceed to reconsider. If, after such retwo-thirds of the members present shall agree to pass

the bill it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of the members present, it shall become a law . . . If any
bill presented to the governor contain several sections or items, he
may object to one or nore sections or items while approving other

portions ojfthe bill. In such case he shall append to the bill, at the time
of signing it, a statement of the section, or sections; item or items to
which he objects and the reasons therefor, and the section or sections,
item or items so objected to, shall not take effect unless passed over
the governor's objection, as hereinbefore provided. (emphasis added)
Most features of the Governor's veto power in Washington are similar to those contained in the constitutions of the other states: The
Governor must exercise the veto power within a prescribed period of
time after the Legislature passes a bill; the Governor must state his
objections giving rise to the veto; and the Legislature can override a
gubernatorial veto only by a two-thirds vote of the members of both
houses.2 However, unlike all but two of the other 40 state constitutions which permit the partial veto,: the Washington Constitution
does not expressly limit the partial veto power to appropriation bills;
it permits the Governor to veto "one or more sections or items while
approving other portions of the bill," which literally allows any bill to
be subject to a partial veto. The scope of this partial veto power has
been the subject of several Washington Supreme Court cases.
The Washington Supreme Court in Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax
Commissiont construed the word "section" in the constitutional pro-

2. A survey of state constitutions reveals that most of these features are common
to all state constitutions, with the exception of North Carolina's constitution which
contains no veto provision.
3. Article IV. Section 23. of the South Carolina Constitution authorizes the Governor to veto "one or more of the items or Sections contained in any Bill ....
""
Article V. Section 15a. of the Oregon Constitution gives the Governor power to veto
appropriation items and "any provision in new bills declaring an emergency without
thereby affecting any other provision of such bill." All other state constitutions with
the partial veto power, except Washington. expressly limit it to appropriations bills.
See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 16.

4. 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934). This case was summarily relied on in a
companion case. Tacoma v. State Tax Comm'n. 177 Wash. 604. 33 P.2d 899 (1934).
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vision "to have to do more with the subject matter than with arbitrary
divisions, but divisions, if properly made, tend to indicate subject
matter."5 In upholding the Governor's veto of a portion of a bill, the
court in Cascade noted that the vetoed language "did not modify or
limit in any way or in any degree the preceding provisions, but...
[it constitutes] a new, separate, distinct, and ... independent provision . ..."( Thus, under the rule established in Cascade, the governor may veto a "section" of a bill which is not a distinct subdivision
so long as the vetoed portion constitutes a subject matter which is separate, distinct and independent from the remainder of the bill.7
The Washington Supreme Court in State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini8
construed the word "items" in the constitutional provision to be
broader than just appropriation items. That case arose from Governor
Rosellini's veto of the phrase, "Governor, twenty-two thousand five
hundred dollars;" from a section of a bilP which provided salary increases for a host of elected state officials, including the Governor.
The court, in upholding the veto on the ground that the phrase constituted an "item" within the purview of Article III, Section 12, stated:10
We find no merit in the contention that only an item in an appropriation bill is within the purview of the constitutional provision. Foreign
states so holding have dissimilar constitutions, hence their rules are
not applicable or persuasive in this case.
Ruoff stands for the proposition that the word "items" is not limited to items in an appropriation bill and provides the legal basis for
the Governor's asserted power to veto individual words and phrases
5. 176 Wash. at 620, 30 P.2d at 977.
6. Id. at 619-20, 30 P.2d at 977.
7. The court in Cascade reasoned that to limit the meaning of "sections" to artificial subdivisions of bills would allow the Legislature to preclude the Governor from
exercising his section veto power merely by the Legislature's skillful arrangement of
bills. Based on a reading of the session law in dispute in Cascade, it would appear
that the court's concern was valid. The session law, ch. 191, [1933] Wash. Laws, provid6s for an occupation tax. One key section of this bill, which defines who is liable
for the tax and prescribes the tax, takes up approximately eight pages of the 1933 session laws.
The court did not discuss the inevitable difficulties which would result from its holding. Certainly, no precise method exists to determine whether a portion of a bill comprises a subject matter which is separate, distinct and independent from the remainder
of the bill.
8. 55Wn. 2d 554, 348 P.2d 971(1960).
9. Ch. 316,§ I, [1959] Wash. Laws.
10. 55 Wn. 2d at 556, 348 P.2d at 973.
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which may not fall within the Cascade rule.I However, Ruoff only
presented the question of whether a monetary provision which is not
an appropriation item is within the scope of "items," and thus leaves
unanswered the question of whether "items" includes any nonmonetary word, phrase, punctuation or other matter within a bill.
Perhaps the correct interpretation of Ruoff on the meaning of
"item" as used in Article III, Section 12, is that "item" is not limited
to appropriation items in appropriation bills but also includes either
any monetary provision in any bill or any monetary provision in any
bill which by itself can or will result in the spending of money. Supporting this interpretation is the argument that if the word "items" in
Section 12 includes any word, phrase, punctuation, or other matter in
any bill, then the word "sections" as used in Article III, Section 12, of
the Washington State Constitution is mere surplusage and the rule
established in Cascade is meaningless.
Both Cascade and Ruoff continue the rule established in Spokane
Grain & Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker '2 that a veto of any portion of a bill is
invalid if the veto is "affirmative" as opposed to "negative." Although
Washington case law fails to provide any detailed explanation as to
what constitutes an "afirmative" or "negative" veto,' 3 case law from
other jurisdictions has emphasized that the veto is not a creative
power. '
II.

QUANTITATIVE USE OF THE VETO POWER
FROM 1933 THROUGH 1973

Appendix A shows the nature and extent of the vetoes exercised by
govenors during the period from 1933 through 1973. Prior to the 1959
Regular Session of the Legislature, the veto power was used with few

II. Set, Letter from the Governor's Administrative Assistant to the (then) Senate
Committee on Constitution and Elections, Jan. 17. 1973. and attached memorandum.
12. 59Wash. 76. 109 P. 316(1910).
13. The Washington court did attempt to explain this concept in Spokane Grain &
Fuel Co. v. Lyttaker, 59 Wash. 76, 86, 109 P. 316. 320 (1910).
14. For example, the Montana supreme court has stated: "The veto is distinctly a
negative, not a creative, power. The general rule is that the Governor may not exercise
any creative legislative power whatsoever.
...
Mills v. Porter. 69 Mont. 325. 331.
222 P. 428. 430 (1924). Similarly, the Michigan supreme court has stated: "The veto
power is a legislative function, although it is not affirmative and creative, but is strictly
negative and destructive." Wood v. State Administrative Bd.. 255 Mich. 220. 224. 238
N.W. 16. 18(1931).
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exceptions only to veto entire bills, entire sections and entire appropriation items.' 5 Apparently, the governors in power prior to 1959 interpreted the word "item," as used in Article III, Section 12, to be limited
to appropriation items. ' 1
Prior to the 1957 Regular Session, governors generally vetoed more
bills in their entirety than they partially vetoed.' 7 Beginning in 1959, a
new partial veto trend began to appear when the then incumbent governor vetoed less than an entire section in four nonappropriation bills
passed during the 1959 Regular and Special Sessions.' 8 This trend increased dramatically after the Ruoff decision in 1960 and reached its
apex when the Governor exercised 149 partial vetoes on bills passed
by the 42nd Legislature,"') 123 of which removed less than an entire
section from nonappropriation bills2 0 aid 26 of which removed less
than an entire item from appropriation bills.2 ' The significance of these
figures is enhanced when one considers that during the entire period
from 1933 to 1957 only 26 partial vetoes were exercised which removed less than an entire section from nonappropriation bills 22 and
only in one instance did a governor veto less than an entire appropria23
tion item.
Besides the partial veto trend, the data in Appendix A support the
following observations: Although the total number of bills partially
and fully vetoed2 4 increased from 1933 through 1973, the proportion of
15. See Appendix A, cols. (4), (6) & (I1).
16. This comment is based on the author's review of each veto exercised by Washington's governors from 1933 to the present. The exceptions are the present Governor
and his predecessor. There have been a few instances where governors in power prior
to 1959 exercised the item veto power on nonappropriation bills, but these instances
were so few relative to the number of bills totally or "section" vetoed by these Governors that they cannot be relied upon for the proposition that these Governors believed the item veto power extended to other than appropriation bills.
Some examples of these Governors' uses of the item veto power on nonappropriation bills are Governor Martin's partial veto of S.B. 219, WASH. H.R. JoUR. 898 (1933)
(note, however, that the Governor relied on an Attorney General Opinion which
stated that the constitution empowered the Governor to veto any section or item of a
bill); Governor Wallgren's partial veto of H.B. 353, WASH. H.R. JOUR. 1003 (1945);
Governor Langlie's partial veto of S.B. 82, WASH. S. JOUR. 1019 (1955).
17. See note 16 supra. From 1933 through 1956, there were 188 bills fully vetoed
and 118 partially vetoed. See Appendix A. cols. (4) & (5). From 1957 through April
of 1973, there were 51 bills totally vetoed and 255 partially vetoed.
18. See Appendix A, col. (8), for the 36th Legislature (1959-60).
19. Id., cols. (9) & (12), for the 42d Legislature (1971-72).
20. Id., col. (9).
21. Id., col. (12).
22. Id., col. (9), summed through the 34th Legislature (1955-56).
23. Id., col. (12). summed through the 34th Legislature (1955-56).
24. Id., col. (3).
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total bills vetoed to total bills passed2 did not increase over this period
2 ;
due to the increase in the number of bills passed in recent sessions.
However, both the number of partial vetoes per bill and the number
of nonappropriation bills subjected to the partial veto have increased
markedly since 1959. This increase in the popularity of partial vetoes
is in all likelihood attributable in part to the liberal item veto power
approved in Ruoff.
lII.

QUALITATIVE USE OF THE VETO POWER
FROM 1933 THROUGH 1973

The Washington Governors' partial vetoes are commonly classified
as either "substantive" or "corrective." Generally, those partial vetoes
designed to improve the technical accuracy of bills, for example the
resolution of ambiguities, are classified as "corrective." Partial vetoes
which are designed to achieve substantive or policy changes are classi'2 7
fied as "substantive.
The corrective veto often is a useful tool to enhance the quality of
legislation. Traditionally, the Washington Legislature has waited until
the last few days before final adjournment of a legislative session to
pass the bulk of the session's legislation. 28 During the inevitable log
jam2' of these last few days, deliberation, so important to the legislative process, is nearly impossible and the technical accuracy of the

25. Compare id., col. (3), with id., col. (2).
26. Using the figures from Appendix A. col. (2), one can compute that the average
number of bills passed during each of the Legislatures from 1933 up to 1957 was 288.
and that the average number for each of the Legislatures from 1957 to present is 370.
27. Generally. these definitions have been used by both the Legislature's Legislative
Council Staff and the Governor's Staff as a means to determine the number of corrective and substantive vetoes. See Legislative Council Staff Memorandum to Members of
the Judiciary Committee, October 1.1971; and Letter from the Governor's Administrative Assistant to the (then) Senate Committee on Constitution and Elections, Jan. 17.
1973. and attached memorandum. In both memoranda the authors suggest that these
definitions have their shortcomings in that they are largely subjective and what may be
defined as "corrective" by one person may be considered "substantive" by another.
28. This fact was made obvious to the author in reading the veto messages on
bills vetoed from 1933 to present. The great bulk of these messages were dated after
the Legislature had adjourned. This indicates not only that the bills were passed
toward the end of the session, but also that the Legislature would not have an opportunity to override the veto until the next session.
29. On many occasions, these log jams have prevented the Legislature from adjourning the session by midnight of the last day prescribed for the session. In such
cases, the Legislature customarily stays in session until late the next morning in order
to complete the session's business. In State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Institute. Inc. v.
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legislation passed tends to reflect the legislators' haste. The resulting
technical errors frequently can be corrected through the Governor's
partial veto power.3 0
One of the most frequent correctable technical errors occurs in bills
which amend the same law in an inconsistent or duplicative manner.
For example, during the 1973 Regular Session, the Legislature passed
two bills, 3' 1 each of which amended R.C.W. § 50.16.030 to provide
for an administrative funding extension of unemployment compensation. To eliminate the duplication, the Governor vetoed a section of
32
one of the bills.
Corrective vetoes have also been used to render unconstitutional
laws constitutional. For example, a bill passed during the 1973 First
Extraordinary Session 3 3 contained a section prescribing the effective
date of the bill to be July 1, 1973, some 15 days earlier than the constitutionally prescribed effective date of July 16, 1973.34 The Gov35
ernor corrected the bill to make it constitutional.
Finally, corrective vetoes have often been used to resolve ambiguities in bills. For example, during the 1971 First Extraordinary Session, the Legislature passed two bills relating to drugs. One bill36; repealed existing laws defining "narcotic drugs" and "dangerous drugs"
Kinnear, 80 Wn. 2d 175, 492 P.2d 1012 (1972), the Washington court eliminated one
of the causes of log jams by holding that no deadline exists for the adjournment of a
special session.
30. It can be argued that the Governor's use of corrective vetoes has created a
climate in the Legislature which to some degree dissuades the Legislature from correcting its mistakes. Given the scheduling and time problems which have traditionally
plagued the Legislature, legislators frequently are reluctant to slow the progress of a
bill by amending it, especially when they know that the Governor can accomplish the
amendment by his use of the partial veto. If this partial veto power did not exist,
then it would seem that legislators would feel compelled to spend more time reviewing
and perfecting bills.
31. H.B. 436, ch. 73, § 5 [1973] Wash. Laws, and S.B. 2618, ch. 6, § 1,[1973]

Wash. Laws.

32. See Governor Evans' veto message on H.B. 436, ch. 73, § 5, [1973] Wash.
Laws.
33. S.B. 2054, ch. 36. [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.
34. WASH. CONST. art. I. § 41 (amend. 26), provides that 'In] o...
law. . . shall
take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was
enacted."
35. See Governor Evans' veto message on S.B. 2054, ch. 36, [1973] Wash. Laws
istEx. Sess. Some other examples of this kind of corrective veto are Governor Langlie's section veto of S.B. 51, WASH. S. JOUR. 814 (1941), on the ground that its title
was insufficient under WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19, which requires that the title of each
act embody the subject contained therein; Governor Langlie's section veto of H.B. 130,
WASH. H.R. JOUR. 1050 (195 1), on the identical ground of defective title.
36. S.B. 146, ch. 308, [1971] Wash. Laws lstEx. Sess.

609

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 603, 1974

and provided a comprehensive system for regulating and proscribing
the use of various classes of drugs. The other bil 37 contained an inconsistent section providing for mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for persons convicted of selling or attempting to sell "narcotic
drugs" or "dangerous drugs" for profit. The Governor corrected the
inconsistency by vetoing the "narcotic drugs" and "dangerous drugs"
section in the latter bill. :3
While the use of the partial veto in a corrective manner may be
considered helpful, its use to substantively alter the basic scope and
policy of legislation by deleting vital words and phrases may be opposed not only by the proscription on affirmative vetoes established in
Spokane Grain & Fuel but by numerous policy arguments: Such a use
increases the already much expanded powers of the Executive, destroys the basic principles of checks and balances and separation of
powers, interferes with the delicate political compromise inherent in
legislation of any significance and encourages use of cumbersome referenda in order to immunize legislation from the partial veto.Y'
The most significant of these adverse effects is the use of the partial
veto which tends to destroy the compromise inherent in legislation.
The Legislature in our constitutional system determines the policy of
the law, but does so only after a collective process of compromise
among the legislators has culminated in a single product. When used
to substantively alter legislation by deleting crucial words and phrases,
the partial veto power permits the Governor to substitute his individual judgment for the collective judgment of the Legislature, thereby disrupting the political balance achieved through the legislative
process."0 While the Governor should be vested with the veto power,
37. S.B. 108, ch. 295. [1971] Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess.
38. See Governor Evans' veto message on S.B. 108. WASH. S. JOUR. 2009 (1971).
Other examples of bills vetoed on the ground that they were ambiguous, vague or in
need of clarification, are numerous. Illustrative of this use of the partial veto is the
fact that of the 33 bills passed during the 1973 First Extraordinary Session and partially vetoed, eight of these bills appear to have been vetoed at least in part in order to
resolve an ambiguity or clarify the bill. See Governor Evans' veto messages on the
following bills which were passed during the 1973 First Extraordinary Session: H.B.
590, Sub. H.B. 711. H.B. 720. H.B. 901. S.B. 2153. S.B. 2256. Sub. S.B. 2800. Sub.
S.B. 2854.
39. See, e.g., Note, The Item Veto in the American Con.,tiittional Sy,.tem, 25 GEO.
L.J. 106 (1936). The Governor cannot veto referenda. WASH. CONST. art. 11. § I(d).
40. The continued use of the partial veto power, especially those vetoes of isolated
words, phrases and other matter in bills. may have a reactionary influence on the
Legislature. Legislators' apprehension over the partial veto power has a tendency to
discourage the chance of passage of important and controveisial bills. Legislators who
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that powdr should permit him only to approve or disapprove entirely
the Legislature's final product and should not permit him to approve a
bill and at the same time utilize the partial veto to alter portions which
he finds unpalatable.
An example of a substantive or "creative" use of the partial veto
may best illustrate its capacity to undermine the legislative system.
Subsection 6 (1) of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973,41
passed during the 1973 First Extraordinary Session, deals with the
landlord's duty to keep the tenant's premises fit for human habitation.
This Subsection contained the following partial veto:
The landlord will at all times during the tenancy keep the premises
fit for human habitation, and shall in particular:
(1) Maintain the premises to substantially comply with any applicable code, statute, ordinance, or regulation governing their maintenance or operation, which the legislative body enacting the applicable
code, statute, ordinance or regulation could enforce as to the'premises
rented if such condition substantially endangers or impairs the health
or safety of the tenant.... (emphasis added to vetoed- portion)
The Governor justified the deletion on the grounds that the limitation
created too difficult a burden of proof for tenants wanting to take
advantage of the new law. 42 Without vetoing the whole bill or even
the entire section, the extent of the landlord's obligation was significantly increased and substantively altered from that contemplated by
the Legislature, possibly destroying a delicate compromise between the
forces supporting and those opposing landlord-tenant legislation. Even
though the change may be thought desirable, the Governor is not the
branch of government in our system given primary responsibility to
legislate social philosophy; that responsibility has been given to the
legislature.
One can only conclude that substantive vetoes reflect the social philosophies of the Governor who makes them.4 3 It is obvious that difspend a great amount of time reaching compromises on bills only to see the compro-

mises late vetoed by the Governor are simply not going to be as willing to work out
compromises in the future. A legislator today may never know if he is, in fact, reach-

ing a true compromise because it is possible that the legislator with whom he is dealing
may persuade the Governor to veto the compromise.
41. Ch. 207,§ 6, [1973] Wash. Laws IstEx. Sess.
42. See Governor Evans' veto message on Sub. S.B. 2226, ch. 207, [1973] Wash.

Laws, Ist Ex. Sess.
43.

An idea of the role played by the Governor's social philosophy in the veto

process can be obtained by reviewing some of the vetoes of Clarence D. Martin, who
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ferent governors will have different social philosophies and that what
one governor may oppose another governor may endorse. A look at
the substantive vetoes made by Washington governors reveals that not
infrequently a governor has approved a bill that a previous governor
44
has vetoed.
Table 1 shows the role played by the corrective and substantive
veto during the sessions beginning with the 1969 Regular Session and
45
ending with the adjournment of the 1971 Special Session.
TABLE I
SUBSTANTIVE AND CORRECTIVE VETOES
No. of partially vetoed
bills containing substantive
vetoes

No. of partially vetoed
bills containing corrective
vetoes

Special Sessions

3 1

21

1970 Special
Session

10

7

1971 Regular&
Special Sessions

29

2-2

TOTALS

70

50

Sessions

1969 Regular &

was Washington's governor during the depression sessions beginning in 1933 through
1939. Governor Martin vetoed: (1) portions of a comprehensive tax bill, which portions would have imposed a tax on stock issues and transfers. on gifts and on proprietary medicines and toilet preparations (H.B. 237, WASH. H.R. JouR. 1007 (1935)):(2)
a bill expanding the junior college system (S.B. 71. WASH. S. Jouft. 778 (1937)): (3)
a bill prohibiting the manufacturing and selling of adulterated or misbranded food.
drugs and cosmetics and prohibiting the false advertising of food, drugs and cosmetics
(S.B. 213. WASH. S. JOUR. 782 (1937)): (4) bills requiring the licensing and bonding
of contractors (S.B. 214, WASH. S. JOUR. 782 (1937) and S.B. 278, WASH. S. JOUR.
784 (1937)); (5) a bill allowing the sale of wine and beer on Sundays (H.B. 443,
WASH. S. JOUR. 896 (1937)). Governor Martin's successor, Arthur B. Langlie. appears
from his vetoes to have been of the same philosophical bent as Governor Martin. and
during his first year as governor he vetoed bills which would have licensed and provided sanitation standards for restaurants and which would have provided a comprehensive state program of meat and meat food product inspection designed to eliminate
unwholesome or adulterated meats and meat food products. H.B. 173. WASH. H.R.
JOUR. 1027 (1941) and H.B. 196. WASH. H.R. JouR. 1029(1941).
44. For example, subsequent to the vetoes described in note 43 so pra, the Legislature passed bills requiring the licensing and bonding of contractors. prohibiting the
manufacturing and selling of adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs and cosmetics.
and providing for a comprehensive state inspection program of meat and meat food
products. all of which the Governor did not veto. See WASH. REV CODE ch's 18.27. 69.04.
16.49A (1963).
45. The information in this Table is taken from a chart prepared by the Legisla-
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This table, in conjunction with Appendix A, indicates that not only
has a trend towards greatly increased use of the partial veto been established in recent years, but also that more bills partially vetoed have
been substantively altered than merely correctively altered.
The need for the corrective veto is the principal argument for retaining the partial veto in the nonappropriation bill context.4 6 It can
be argued, however, that this need is not so great now as it was in previous years, when the Legislature met every two years and then only
for 60 days. Since 1969, the Washington Legislature has met each
year in a lengthy session, thus putting the Legislature in a better position to correct its own mistakes. 47 Furthermore, the resolution of ambiguities in legislation necessarily involves statutory interpretation, a
function best performed by the courts. Finally,. whatever constructive
value may be ascribed to the corrective veto is more than outweighed
by the destructive capacity of the substantive veto.
IV.

A SUGGESTED REVISION OF WASHINGTON
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE III, SECTION 12, TO
LIMIT THE GOVERNOR'S PARTIAL VETO POWER

The adverse impact of the unrestricted partial veto power on the
legislative process and its incompatibility with the basic tenets of our
form of government are substantial reasons to amend the partial veto
power. Such an amendment should preclude the Governor from exercising "creative" partial vetoes which substantively alter legislation
and should be sufficiently clear to leave no doubt concerning the extent of the partial veto power.
An amendment to Article III, Section 12, eliminating the "section"
veto power and restricting the "item" veto power to entire appropriation items would accomplish this goal and bring the veto provisions of
ture's Legislative Council which accompanied a Council Staff Memorandum of Oct. 1,

197 1, to the members of the Judiciary Committee. Because a single bill may contain
both substantive and corrective vetoes, the total number of bills partially. vetoed during
the 41st Legislature (see Appendix A, col. (5)) will not equal the total number of

bills with partial substantive and partial corrective vetoes summarized for the same
years in Table i.
46. See Letter from the Governor's Administrative Assistant to the (then) Senate
Committee on Constitution and Elections, Jan. 17, 1973, and attached memorandum.
47. The historic meeting of the- Legislature in the September, 1973, eight-day

"Mini-Session" further undermines the principal argument for retaining the partial
veto in the nonappropriation bill context.
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the Washington Constitution into conformity with the veto provisions
of most other state constitutionsA8 The retention of the partial veto
power over items in appropriation bills would permit the Governor to
exercise the salutary fiscal restraint which that power is generally
thought to further; namely, the discouragement of "pork barrel" appropriations and "riders." 4-' The following revision of Article III, Section 12, is proposed:511
Every act which shall have passed the legislature shall be, before it
becomes a law, presented to the governor. If he approves, he shall sign
it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in
which it shall have originated, which house shall enter the objections
at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present shall agree to pass
the bill it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of the members present, it shall become a law

. .

. If any

bill presented to the governor contain (sovei4- ee-ie -er-) one or
more items appropriatingmoney, he may object to one or more (5rt4op& or-) items while approving other portions of the bill. In such case
he shall append to the bill, at the time of signing it, a statement of the
(,,o
-eee*4oi.) item or items to which he objects and the reasons
therefor, and the (.e4o-k
-es,,)
item or items so objected to,
shall not take effect unless passed over the governor's objection, as
hereinbefore provided.

48. With some variations, the provisions of most state constitutions permit the governor to strike only entire bills and appropriation items. See note 3 .supra for the provisions of the Oregon and South Carolina constitutions which proide for a greater
power, and note I stpra for those states which do not permit "'item" vetoes. Notwithstanding the provision in the South Carolina Constitution which, like Article III.
Section 12. of the Washington State Constitution. allows the Governor to veto "sections
or items." the South Carolina Governors have only used the item veto power on appropriation items. Conversation with the Chief Counsel for the South Carolina Legislative Council. There is no reported South Carolina case indicating that the South
Carolina Governor's item veto power extends to nonappropriation items
49. See, e.g., Note. The Item Veto in the American Constittitional Sy. tem, 25
GEo. L.J. 106(1936).
50. Parenthetical language constitutes language which would be deleted from the
existing Article Ill. Section 12: italicized language constitutes language which would
be added. It is noted that during both the 1971 and 1973 regular sessions, a measure
was introduced to revise Article 11. Section 12. This measure (designated Senate Joint
Resolution 14 during the 1971 regular session and Senate Joint Resolution 103 during
the 1973 regular session) would restrict the "'item" veto power to items in appropriation bills and would retain the "section" veto power.
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Partial Veto
In conclusion, a statistical analysis of Washington governors' use of
the partial veto power since 1933 reveals a recent increase in both the
scope of and the reliance on this power to substantively alter legislation. This use of the partial veto power is destructive of the legislative
process and results in expansion of the power of the Executive. Recent
and unfortunate experience at the national level has demonstrated the
danger in permitting the Executive to assume unbridled powers.5 1
Since the Washington Supreme Court has not seen fit to clearly limit
the use of the partial veto power, the only recourse appears to be a
constitutional amendment.

5 1. The Watergate episode is illustrative.
52.

The figures used in this chart were compiled from the veto messages contained

in the LEGISLATIVE DIGEST for each session of the Legislature from 1933 through the
1973 First Extraordinary Session.
53.

Includes only bills with vetoed sections which are shown as actual sections in

the bills.
54.
55.

Includes only bills with portions of actual bill sections vetoed.
Includes as a single partial veto all stricken contiguous language and punctua-

tion. Language or punctuation is only considered contiguous if it immediately follows
or immediately precedes other stricken language or punctuation.
56. Includes only bills with vetoed sections which are shown as actual sections in

the bills.
57. Includes each monetary amount listed in an appropriation section, together
with adjacent language describing or limiting the manner in which the monetary
amount can be spent.
58.

Includes vetoes of the portion of an appropriation bill which directs the

method of using the amount appropriated for a particular use or department. See
Beckman, The Item Veto Power of the Executive, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 27 (1957).
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